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Abstract  
This paper examines how the relative shares of public and private health 
expenditures impact income inequality. We study a two period overlapping 
generation’s growth model in which longevity is determined by both private 
and public health expenditure and human capital is the engine of growth. 
Increased investment in health, reduces mortality, raises return to education 
and affects income inequality. In such a framework we show that the cross-
section earnings inequality is non-decreasing in the private share of health 
expenditure.  
We test this prediction empirically using a variable that proxies for the 
relative intensity of investments (private versus public) using vaccination 
data from the National Sample Survey Organization for 76 regions in India 
in the year 1986-87. We link this with region-specific expenditure inequality 
data for the period 1987-2012. Our empirical findings, though focused on a 
specific health investment (vaccines), suggest that an increase in the share of 
the privately provided health care results in higher inequality. 
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1  Introduction  
This paper contributes to the growing debate on whether the delivery of health care should 
be public or private by examining the interplay between the shares of public and private 
health expenditure in an economy and income inequality. Although the total spending on 
public and private health care has been rising in most countries, there are considerable 
differences in the mixture of public and private health spending both within and across 
countries. Our objective is to examine both theoretically and empirically the role that the 
mix of health expenditure between public and private plays in explaining the 
intergenerational transmission of income and inequality. We examine this issue in a two 
period overlapping generations growth model in which mortality is endogenous and human 
capital is the engine of growth.  
There is considerable evidence that points to the fact that poor health in childhood 
lowers future income through its effects on schooling and labor force participation. What is 
less well understood is whether the share of private and public health expenditure affects 
income inequality. In Figure 1 we present evidence on the association between the shares of 
private and public health expenditure and income inequality across countries. It plots the 
public health expenditure (considered to be a proxy for prevalence of public health care 
system) as percentage of total health expenditure in 1995 against income inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient in 2010. The plot suggests that a higher share of public 
health expenditure is associated with lower level of income inequality in the long run. This 
idea is formally examined as below.  
We begin by developing a theoretical model that establishes the link between the 
shares of public and private health expenditures and income inequality. Our paper extends 
the Glomm and Ravikumar (GR) (1992) model of endogenous growth, to include both public 
and private expenditures on health. Mortality is endogenous in our setup where the length 
of life of the adult depends upon a composite good we term as “health input”, a function of 
both public and private provision of health expenditure. Private health expenditure is 
incurred by the parent who has a bequest motive and invests in the health of the offspring. 
The government levies taxes on the income of the adults and uses tax revenues to provide 
"free" public health. The taxes are endogenously determined in each period through majority 
voting and are shown to be constant and independent of income. This allows us to abstract 
from political economy considerations.  
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Each agent’s stock of human capital depends on the parent’s stock of human capital, 
time spent in school, and the health input. The linkage across generations in our model 
therefore stems from two distinct channels. First, as mentioned earlier, the stock of human 
capital of the parent directly affects the human capital stock of the young. Second, the 
investment on the health input of the young is a function of parental human capital. The 
consequent impact on length of life affects the rate at which the young discount the future, 
thereby impacting their investment in human capital.  
Next, we seek to understand the impact of the relative shares of health expenditure on 
income inequality. Our key takeaway is that income inequality is lower in economies which 
have a higher share of public health expenditure. The intuition follows from the fact that 
under a public regime, all agents have equal access to health care whereas under a private 
regime their access is dependent upon their initial income level. In particular, due to 
diminishing returns to human capital, low income individuals enjoy higher earnings growth 
than high income individuals in transition causing income inequality to shrink under the 
public regime. By contrast, under the private regime high income individuals invest more in 
health and grow faster whereas low income individuals get stuck in the vicious cycle of poor 
health and low income. Hence any differences in the initial level of income are exacerbated 
over time under the private regime.  
The key theoretical prediction of our model is that an increase in the share of private 
to public expenditure on health care results in an increase in income inequality. The 
relationship plays out by pivoting on the effect of the share of private to public health care 
spending on the longevity of individuals.  
Empirically, we test this prediction using data on the relative demand from private 
versus public sources of vaccines. We focus on vaccines since they are essential in 
determining longevity of individuals. We use Indian data from the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO). The Indian government initiated the Expanded Programme on 
Immunization (EPI) in 1978 and the Universal Immunization Programme (UIP) in 1985, to 
reduce morbidity, mortality and disability from diseases, by providing free vaccination 
services to eligible children. The UIP started vaccination against BCG (Bacillus Calmette–
Guérin), polio, DPT (Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus) and measles in the year 1985 
(Lahariya, 2014). We use the vaccine information from 42nd NSS Round, corresponding to 
the year, 1986-87, one year after the introduction of the UIP in India. We use this as the 
baseline year and study the corresponding regional inequality measures over the period 
1987-88 to 2011-12.  
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We create proxy measures of the demand for public and private sources of vaccine 
providers in 76 regions of India. We find that the relative demand for measles vaccine varies 
considerably across the regions- from 100% public provisioning in Sikkim to around 50% 
public provisioning in Northern Inland Andhra Pradesh during 1986/87. We combine this 
with regional inequality measures constructed from quinquennial household consumption 
surveys conducted by the NSSO for the years 1987 to 2012 to assess whether a higher 
relative share of private vaccine provision results in subsequently higher inequality.  
Our estimates using ordinary least squares (OLS) shows that a higher relative share of 
private sources of vaccination is associated with an increase in inequality. In particular, our 
estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the private-public share of vaccine 
provision results in a 1.5 percent increase in inequality, an estimate that is robust to alternate 
measures of inequality- the Gini, the logarithm of variance and the variance of logarithms 
(Cowell 2011). Recognizing that it would also be important to consider the private share in 
other dimensions of health care, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of 
variables such as prenatal and postnatal care. Our estimates remain robust to this inclusion. 
In addition, our results remain robust to a battery of other specification checks.  
We recognize the possibility that initial government investments in vaccines may be 
higher in regions with high mortality rates. In particular, if government investments in 
vaccine provision are selectively higher in the low life expectancy areas, then the share of 
private to public investments should be systematically lower in the low-life expectancy areas 
relative to the high-life expectancy areas. Similarly, if the government seeks to reduce 
inequality, its investments may be higher in areas with higher inequality. Both of the 
aforementioned possibilities must result in a negative cross-sectional correlation between 
the ratio of private to public investments and income inequality. Thus, non-random 
Government investments across regions should result in a downward bias (towards the null 
hypothesis of no effect) on our estimated effect of the share of private to public investments 
in vaccines on subsequent income inequality.  
To address this empirical challenge, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach. 
We use the relative share of demand from private to public sources of the polio vaccine as 
our instrumental variable. Our identifying assumption is that administration of the polio 
vaccine does not directly affect mortality and hence does not directly affect our primary 
outcome-inequality. Our IV estimates corroborate our OLS findings and suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in the private share increases income inequality by 2-3 %. A 
potential threat to the validity of our IV is that polio vaccine could affect disability and hence 
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directly affect income (and inequality). We empirically test this possibility, and fail to reject 
the hypothesis that the private share of vaccines is not associated with disability.  
This paper is linked to a select literature that has sought to examine the link between 
health and income inequality. Chakraborty and Das (CD) (2005) introduce endogenous and 
accidental bequests in an otherwise standard overlapping generation’s model with 
production; in particular, the probability with which a young agent survives into old age 
depends on the private health investment made by the young. Owing to lower longevity, 
children from poorer households are more likely to receive low bequests and the resultant 
wealth effect sets off a cycle of poor health and income.  
Lahiri and Richardson (2008) extend the (CD) framework to allow individuals vote 
on the division of tax revenues between public health spending and a lump sum transfer and 
examine its impact on wealth inequality. Our paper complements both these papers. The key 
linkage between generations in our model occurs through parental investment in the 
progeny’s health and we abstract away from issues related to accidental bequests.  
Our work is also related to Dottori (2009) who develops an overlapping generation 
model and examines separately the dynamics of income inequality over time under public 
and private health regimes. Unlike Dottori, we consider a “mixed or a hybrid economy” with 
both public and private expenditures and focus on how the relative shares of these 
expenditures affect income inequality. Further, consistent with our empirical analysis the 
focus is more on cross sectional income inequality. Most importantly, the aforementioned 
literature on health is largely purely theoretical. Our paper is one of the few studies that 
provides empirical evidence on the effect of the relative share of private health expenditure 
on cross sectional income inequality.  
In summary, our results imply that a higher share of public health investments in 
vaccines may also result in reducing key economic outcomes such as income inequality. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 describes 
the economy under homogenous agents while Section 4 illustrates the same for 
heterogeneous agents and carries out a simple simulation exercise. Section 5 presents our 
empirical analysis while Section 6 describes our empirical results. Finally, Section 7 
contains the concluding remarks.  
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2  The Model  
Our model extends Glomm and Ravikumar’s (1992) two-period overlapping generation’s 
framework to include endogenous longevity. We abstract away from issues related to 
fertility or population growth and assume that at the end of one’s youth an individual gives 
birth to a single offspring. Individuals born at time period ݐ have identical preferences over 
leisure when young, consumption and the opportunity to invest in health of their offspring 
when old. Formally, the preferences of an individual born at time t is represented by 
 U ൌ 	lnሺ݊௧ሻ ൅ ߶ሺݔ௧ሻሾlnሺܿ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ߙ lnሺݔ௧ାଵሻሿ (1) 
where ݊௧ is leisure at time ݐ, ܿ௧ାଵ is consumption at time ሺݐ ൅ 1ሻ and the parameter α 
captures parental altruism. We term ߶ሺ. ሻ  as the longevity function, which depends on the 
health input, x provided by the parental generation. This health input, which is a composite 
good, is obtained as a Cobb-Douglas function of public and private health expenditures 
given by 
 ݔ௧ ൌ ߟ݄௧௤ܪ௧ଵି௤ (2) 
where H denotes per capita public health expenditure and h denotes agent’s private health 
expenditure. The parameters q and (1 − q) represent the share of private and public health 
expenditure of the overall health expenditure respectively. The longevity function ߶ is 
weakly increasing and concave in health input and satisfies 
߶ሺ. ሻ with ߶ሺ0ሻ ൌ 0; ߶ᇱ ൒ 0; ߶ᇱᇱ ൑ 0; lim௫→	ஶ߶ሺݔሻ ൌ 	߶ത 	൑ 1 
Following Chakravarty and Das (2005), we assume this function is given by: 
 ߶ሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ 	ܣݔ
ఢ																		݂݋ݎ	ݔ ൏ ̅ݔ		
߶ത ൌ ܣ̅ݔఢ													for	ݔ ൒ ̅ݔ							
	 (3) 
The parameter ߶ത denotes the maximum longevity as a fraction of the adult life (under the 
current medical technology A > 0), (̅ݔ, ݁̅ሻ are the corresponding critical level of health input 
and earnings and ε is a parameter that lies between (0, 1). When young, individuals allocate 
݊௧ units of their time endowment towards leisure and the remaining towards accumulating 
human capital. Parental knowledge and health inputs are also critical inputs in our human 
capital accumulation equation. Formally, the young individuals at time t accumulate human 
capital, ݁௧ାଵ according to, 
 ݁௧ାଵ ൌ ߦሺ1 െ ݊௧ሻ݁௧ଵିఔݔ௧ఔ  (4) 
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where ݁௧ is the stock of human capital of the parent, ξ denotes the productivity parameter 
associated with human capital accumulation. The income of the individual during the second 
period of life is equal to the stock of human capital, ݁௧ାଵ. The importance of parental 
knowledge as a factor in the process of human capital accumulation is a feature that has been 
well documented. The seminal work by Becker and Tomes (1979) attributes 
intergenerational income persistence not only to genetic factors but also to parental human 
capital. Recent work by Black and Devereux (2011) highlights the link between parental 
human capital and income persistence.  
The effect of health inputs on human capital accumulation is also well established. 
Numerous studies have shown that poor health adversely affects cognitive skills, 
productivity and educational outcomes. Currie and Hyson (1999) use British cohort data and 
find a positive relation between birth weight and educational outcomes. More recently, 
Figlio et al. (2013) using US data provide evidence on the long-term effects of birth weight 
on cognitive development. They find that increases in birth weight can have a positive effect 
on cognitive skills, and hence on adult earnings.  
Public health expenditure per capita, ܪ௧ାଵ is financed by income tax, 
                                                        ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ τ୲ାଵܧ୲ାଵ (5) 
where τ୲ାଵ is the income tax rate imposed on the adults in period ݐ ൅ 1  is determined in 
each period through majority voting; ܧ௧ାଵ ൌ ׬ ݁௧ାଵ	݀	ܨ௧ାଵሺ݁௧ାଵሻ  is the per capita earnings 
as of period ݐ ൅ 1 and F denotes the cumulative earnings distribution. Finally, the budget 
constraint of an individual is given by:  
 ܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ݄௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ	߬௧ାଵ	ሻ݁௧ାଵ (6) 
2.1  Individual’s optimization  
The optimization follows a two-step maximization procedure. In the first step, taking as 
given {݁௧, ݔ௧, ܪ௧ାଵ}, the agents utility maximization problem is to choose ሺ݊௧, ܿ௧ାଵ, ݄௧ାଵ	) to 
maximize (1) subject to (3) and (6). Equivalently, the agent chooses ݊௧ and ݄௧ାଵ to 
maximize: 
 max௡೟,	௛೟శభ U ൌ 	lnሺ݊௧ሻ ൅ ߶ሺݔ௧ሻൣlnሺ1 െ 	τ	ሻሼߦሺ1 െ ݊௧ሻ݁௧
ଵିఔݔ௧ఔሽ ൅ ߙ ln൫ߟ݄௧௤ܪ௧ଵି௤൯൧  
Note that the parental health input ݔ௧ is a predetermined variable for the generation born at 
ݐ. Hence, the optimization problem is concave and well-behaved with the introduction of 
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endogenous longevity. The individual’s optimization problem satisfies the first-order 
conditions 
 ݊௧ ൌ 	 11 ൅ ߶ሺݔ௧ሻ ቀ1 ൅ ݄௧ାଵ	ܿ௧ାଵ ቁ
;				 1ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ߙݍ
1
݄௧ାଵ  
Combining these equations, we get an expression for ݊௧ : 
 ݊௧ ൌ 	 11 ൅ ߶ሺݔ௧ሻሺ1 ൅ ߙݍሻ (7) 
Equation (7) implies that the time allocated to leisure varies inversely with both the health 
input and the share of private expenditure in the overall health expenditure or ௗ௡೟	ௗ௫೟ , 
ௗ௡೟	
ௗ௤ ൑ 0. 
The intuition behind (7) is best understood by considering two extreme cases (a) q = 1, a 
pure private health regime and (b) q = 0, a pure public health regime. Using (7), the 
corresponding expressions for n under these pure regimes can be rewritten as  
                                                      ݊௧௉௥௜௩௔௧௘ ൌ ଵଵାሺଵାఈሻథሺ௛೟ሻ 
 
(8) 
                                                       ݊௧௉௨௕௟௜௖ ൌ ଵଵାథሺு೟ሻ 
 
(9) 
Comparing (8) and (9) it is easy to see that for a given level of health expenditure, the time 
allocated to leisure is higher under the pure public regime when compared to the pure private 
regime. Essentially, unlike in the private health regime, individuals under the pure public 
regime do not factor health investment on their progeny. They therefore compare only the 
marginal benefit of leisure with marginal cost of future consumption. The lower opportunity 
cost of leisure, results in individuals underinvesting in education under this regime. This in 
turn implies that the higher the share of private expenditure in an economy, the lower will 
be the time allocated to leisure; put differently, ௗ௡೟	ௗ௤ ൑ 0.  
We next proceed to solve for the optimal tax rate τ. As already discussed public health 
expenditure is provided by government, which levies a proportional tax τ on wage income 
of the old determined through majority voting. Essentially we assume that the young 
generation is too young to be allowed to vote. Following Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), we 
solve for the agent’s preferred tax rate by maximizing the second period utility given by 
 ln൫ሺ1 െ 	τሻሼߦሺ1 െ ݊௧ሻ݁௧ଵିఔݔ௧ఔሽ൯ ൅ ߙln	ሺߟ݄௧௤ሺ߬௧ܧ௧ሻଵି௤ሻ (10) 
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Note that the old agent’s choice of tax rate does not alter his income but affects the 
fraction of income he can consume. By duality, the outcome of this optimization also 
minimizes the cost of providing a given level of health input ݔ. The maximization over τ 
yields the following first order conditions: 
 ݁௧ାଵ
ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ߙሺ1 െ ݍሻ
1
߬ (11) 
Combining the budget with (7) and (11), we are able to solve for the preferred tax rate 
in terms of the parameters  
 ߬ ൌ 	ߙሺ1 െ ݍሻ1 ൅ ߙ  (12) 
Since the preferred tax is independent of the income, this would be the tax rate under our 
voting equilibria. Equipped with these results, we can express ܿ ௧ and ݄ ௧ as constant fractions 
of ݁௧ as below: 
 ܿ௧ ൌ 11 ൅ ߙ ݁௧ 
݄௧ ൌ ߙ1 ൅ ߙ ݍ݁௧ 
(13) 
Both second period consumption and health investment by the adult are a rising function of 
human capital. From equation (13), it follows that health investment varies positively with 
the degree of altruism, α. Substituting equations (7) and (12) into equation (4) obtains 
 
݁௧ାଵ ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ		ߦ ߠݔ௧
ఢ	
1 ൅ 		ߠݔ௧ఢ	 ݔ௧
ఔ݁௧ଵିఔ							for	ݔ௧ ൏ ̅ݔ		
ߦ ߠ	̅ݔ
ఢ
1 ൅ 		ߠ	̅ݔఢ	 ݔ௧
ఔ݁௧ଵିఔ							otherwise	
 
 
(14) 
where ߠ ൌഥ ܣሺ1 ൅ ߙݍሻ. 
3  Homogeneous case  
The objective of this section is to analyze the paths of earnings when individuals are 
homogeneous. When all households are identical, ݁௧ ൌ ܧ௧ and ௛೟ு೟ ൌ
௤
ሺଵି௤ሻ and the health 
aggregate is linear in earnings 
 ݔ௧ ൌ 	߰݁௧  
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where ߰ ൌ ఎబఈሺଵିఈሻ . 1 
The equation describing the evolution of human capital in the economy is given by,  
 
ܪሺ݁௧ሻ ൌ ݁௧ାଵ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ߦ ߠ߰
ఌାఔ݁௧ଵାఌ
1 ൅ ߠ߰ఌ݁௧ఌ 							for	݁௧ ൏ ݁̅			
		ߦ ߠ߰
ఌାఔ݁̅ఌ݁௧
1 ൅ ߠ߰ఌ	݁̅ఌ		 				otherwise					
 (15) 
   
Notice, it follows from equation (15), ܪᇱሺeሻ ൐ 0	 for any ݁; ܪ′′ሺeሻ ൐ 0	 for ݁ ൏ ݁̅; but 
ܪ’’ሺ݁ሻ ൌ 0 for ݁ ൒ ݁̅. Therefore, the income locus has a convex portion till the critical 
human capital, ݁̅  is reached, beyond which the locus starts following a linear path. Next we 
analyze the dynamics under the three regimes. The results are summarized in the proposition 
below. 
 
Proposition 1. Under the assumption of homogeneous individuals in the economy with the 
same initial level of income,  
1. The dynamic system described by eq (15) may possess at most two fixed point 
equilibria in general.  
2. One is stable, leading to the poverty trap ݁ఝ. The other is unstable, high income 
equilibrium ݁௨. When initial income is low and ݁଴ ൏ ݁௨, the economy converges to 
݁ఝ. For ݁ ଴ ൐ ݁௨, the economy enters the endogenous sustained growth path, in which 
the long-run growth rate is ݃ ൌ ߦ ఏటഄశഌ௘̅ഄ		ଵାఏటഄ௘̅ഄ	. 
Proof. See Appendix A.1 
 
Proposition 1 is best understood using Figure 2A. Clearly, the economy is 
characterized by two fixed point equilibria, ݁ఝ and ݁௨ > 0. Crucially the initial conditions 
determine if the individual ends up on a sustained growth path or a low level equilibrium. 
                                                 
1  Given (12) and (13), the indirect function for health input is ݔ௧ ൌ ሺ߰଴ߟሻ݁௧௤ܧ௧ሺଵି௤ሻ where ߰଴ ൌ
ݍ௤ሺ1 െ ݍሻሺଵି௤ሻ. This means that a different choice of q not only shifts the composition of private and public 
health expenditure, but also affects the level of health status, ݔ. We offset this composition effect by setting 
ߟ ൌ ߟ଴/ሺݍ௤ሺ1 െ ݍሻሺଵି௤ሻሻ so that the composition of private and public health expenditure does not affect the 
size of health input for a given total expenditure. As a result, ߰ ൌ ߰଴ߟ ൌഥ ఎబఈଵିఈ. 
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Proposition (1B) shows that any representative family dynasty with an initial income, ݁ ൏
݁௨ converges to ൌ ݁ఝ . Once income crosses the threshold of ݁௨, one enters the path of 
sustained endogenous growth. The fixed point, ݁௨, is therefore unstable. Intuitively, if a 
family starts off with an income below the threshold in either regime, investment in health 
is low. The consequent reduction in longevity causes the young to underinvest in human 
capital. This results in a vicious cycle of poor health and low income. 
 
Proposition 2. Under the assumption of homogeneous individuals in the economy with the 
same initial level of income,  
1. Per capita income is increasing in the share of private health expenditure, q.  
2. The threshold income level, ݁௨ above which the economy enters the sustained 
endogenous growth path is decreasing in q.  
3. The long-run sustained growth rate is increasing in q.  
Proof. See Appendix A.2  
 
In order to build intuition it is useful to contrast the dynamics in our “mixed or hybrid 
regime" characterized by both public and private health expenditures with those obtained in 
“pure" economies in which are characterized by the presence of either private or public 
health expenditures. It is easy to see from (15) that the income locus under the pure private 
regime is given by 
 
ܬሺ݁௧ሻ ൌ ݁௧ାଵ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓߦ ܣሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ߰
ఢା௩݁௧ଵାఢ
1 ൅ ܣሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ	߰ఌ݁௧ఢ	 						for		݁௧ ൏ ݁̅	
ߦ ܣሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ߰
ఢା௩݁̅ఢ݁௧
1 ൅ ܣሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ	߰ఌ݁̅ఢ	 				otherwise		
 
																						 
 
Notice that ܬᇱሺeሻ ൐ 0 for any ݁; ܬᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ	> 0 for ݁ ൏ ݁̅ ; but  ܬᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ	= 0 for ݁ ൒ ݁̅. Similarly, 
under the public regime the income locus is given by  
 
ܯሺ݁௧, ܧ௧ሻ ൌ ݁௧ାଵ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓߦ ܣ߰
ఢା௩݁௧ଵାఢ
1 ൅ 	ܣ	߰ఌ݁௧ఢ 							for	݁௧ ൏ ݁̅		
ߦ ܣ߰
ఢା௩݁̅ఢ݁௧
1 ൅ ܣ	߰ఌ݁̅ఢ	 							otherwise		
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It follows that, ܯᇱሺ݁ሻ ൐ 0	 for any ݁; ܯᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ	> 0 for ݁ ൏ ݁̅ ; but  ܯᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ	= 0 for ݁ ൒
݁̅.	Therefore, as in the hybrid and the private regime, the income locus has a convex portion 
till the critical human capital, ݁̅  is reached, beyond which the locus starts following a linear 
path.  
Figure 2B plots the income loci under the three regimes. The dotted red line represents 
income locus under the hybrid regime, the solid blue line the private income locus and the 
dotted yellow line represents the public income locus. If individuals start off with the same 
human capital under the three regimes, human capital accumulation under the pure private 
regime will always be greater than that in the pure public regime.  
The young under the private regime take into account the fact that their health 
investment impacts the income of their progeny. This in turn leads to higher time investment 
for accumulating human capital compared to the public regime. As individuals choose to 
accumulate less human capital under the public regime, the economy requires higher initial 
income to attain the sustained endogenous growth path.  
Since the hybrid regime is a composite of the public and private regimes the "take off" 
income at which the economy enters a sustained growth path lies between the pure public 
and private regimes. Once the income crosses the critical level and attains endogenous 
growth, the long-run income growth rate becomes constant under all three regimes. This 
growth rate under the hybrid regime lies between those obtained under the private and public 
regimes. Once again this is due to the fact that under the private regime health investments 
are fully internalized unlike the hybrid and the public regimes.  
4  Heterogeneous case  
Having characterized income dynamics under the homogenous case, we are now set to 
evaluate and compare income inequality for alternative values of q under heterogeneous 
agents. We first derive the equilibrium law of motion for human capital when agents are 
heterogeneous. Notice, that unlike the homogenous case, here, the indirect function for the 
health status takes both individual and average earnings as its arguments: 2  
 ݔ௜௧ ൌ ߰݁௜௧௤ܧ௧ଵି௤  
The corresponding equilibrium law of motion for human capital is given by  
                                                 
2 This section introduces the subscript ݅ 	to denote an individual household so that household and economy level 
variables are distinguished clearly. 
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(16) 
While many of our results are derived analytically, we rely on numerical computations to 
illustrate the impact of ݍ on cross sectional income inequality. Since closed-form solutions 
are difficult to obtain, our endeavour is to provide examples showing how income inequality 
is impacted by different values of ݍ. We emphasize that this section is not intended to be a 
comprehensive calibration exercise; we only wish to illustrate some qualitative features of 
the model using plausible parameterization of the model.  
We start by specifying the exogenous income distribution and assigning values for 
parameters. We assume a lognormal income distribution with mean and standard deviation 
of the logarithm of income being ߤ and ߪ respectively. This is commonly assumed in both 
empirical and theoretical literature. Other parameters of the model include ߙ, which is the 
weight of health relative to consumption in the utility function, ݍ, the parameter measuring 
share of private expenditure in total health expenditure, ߳ the parameter that captures the 
elasticity of longevity increase with respect to health input, ߥ which measures the effect of 
childhood health investment on human capital production and the two scale parameters ܣ 
and ߦ. In the baseline calibration, we calibrate these eight parameters to match certain 
characteristics of the Indian data in the period spanning 1985-2007.  
First, ߤ and ߪ are calibrated to match the Gini coefficient for Indian households in 
1985. For India in 1985 the Gini coefficient was around 0.3 (Pal and Ghosh (2007)). Using 
this we set the log-mean to ߤ = 7 and log-standard deviation to ߪ = 0.55. Given our utility 
specification where α measures the weight on health relative to consumption we set ߙ equal 
to 0.05 as this would be broadly consistent with the share of health in aggregate consumption 
expenditure. Next, we set ݍ = 0.7 to match the share of private health expenditure in total 
health expenditure in the Indian data (World Bank, authors own calculations using NSSO 
data).  
We assume that one period in our model corresponds to 20 years. This is based on our 
assumption that the young generation cannot participate in voting. This would mean that we 
would need to introduce at least two additional periods to make the model more realistic. 
However, as emphasized earlier the objective of the simulation exercise is qualitative and 
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not quantitative and therefore we stick to the two period model. The dynamics obtained will 
provide the foundation for the empirical analysis carried out in the next section.  
The underlying parameters in the longevity function are recovered by the following 
steps. First, for simplicity, the age 100 is taken the maximum age. Then the fraction of the 
adulthood life-expectancy, ߶, is calculated by  
߶௧ ൌ ୪୧୤ୣ	ୣ୶୮ୣୡ୲ୟ୬ୡ୷	ୟ୲	ୠ୧୰୲୦	ୟ୲	୲ିଶ଴ଵ଴଴ିଶ଴   
Data on life expectancy at birth is obtained from the World Bank. Consistent with our 
model, the above specification implies that all improvements at life expectancy at birth can 
be attributed to an increase in longevity during adulthood. Finally, we estimate ߳ and ܣ by 
the following ordinary least square model:3   
log߶௧  ൌ   logܣ ൅ ߳ log ݔ௧ ൅ ݑ௧ 
The parameter ξ is calibrated to match the long-run annual growth of 2 percent and υ 
is set at 0.1. Table 1 reports the calibrated values.  
4.1  Simulation results  
This section reports the results from our simple calibration exercise. Specifically, we 
examine the path of income inequality under different values of ݍ. Figure 3 traces the path 
of Gini coefficient under different values of ݍ. It is evident from the figure that economies 
with a higher share of private health expenditure, ݍ, are associated with a higher income 
inequality. Moreover, economies with relatively high ݍ’s exhibit rising inequalities over 
extended periods of time. It takes more than 10 generations or 200 years before the earnings 
inequality eventually declines. This key result in this section is summarized below 
Result: The cross-section earnings inequality is non-decreasing in the private share 
of health expenditure, ݍ.  
The intuition is best understood by focussing on the extreme cases of ݍ ൌ 0; ݍ  ൌ  1.  
Notice, from (16), for ݔ௜௧ ൏ ̅ݔ, డ௘೔೟శభడ௘೔೟ ൐ 0, 
డమ௘೔೟శభ
డ௘೔೟మ
|௤ୀ଴ ൏ 0 and డ
మ௘೔೟శభ
డ௘೔೟మ
|௤ୀଵ ൐ 0.	Also for 
ݔ௜௧ ൒ ̅ݔ, ݁௜௧ାଵ is concave in both ܧ௧ and ݁௜௧. These imply that while any initial differences 
                                                 
3 In this process, we arbitrarily choose ߟ଴= 0.5429ൌ෥  0.7଴.଻0.3଴.ଷ so that η drops out in the health aggregate for 
the baseline case. This does not affect results because ߟ଴ and ܣ are not separately recoverable from observable 
data. 
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in income are exacerbated under the private regime, these differences are reduced over time 
under the public regime. The above results which can be generalized under reasonable 
parameter values for a broader range of ݍ, imply that cross-section income inequality is non-
decreasing in ݍ.  
Essentially, under high values of ݍ, the hybrid regime behaves like the pure private 
regime in the region ݔ௧ ൏ ̅ݔ. Here, higher initial income by facilitating greater private 
investment in health results in faster income growth rate. This means that any initial income 
inequality is exacerbated over time. By contrast, under low values of ݍ the economy behaves 
more like a pure public regime. In this scenario, since health care provision is the same for 
all, low income individuals experience faster growth than high income individuals owing to 
diminishing returns for a given level of per capita income. This results in declining 
inequality.  
Finally, for a sufficiently high critical mass of ݔ௜௧ ൒ ̅ݔ, there is a decline in income 
inequality in an economy over time. This follows from the fact that under this scenario ݁௜௧ାଵ 
is concave in both ܧ௧ and ݁௜௧. Intuitively, since a significant proportion of the population 
reaches maximum longevity, decreasing returns to human capital accumulation sets in. 4   
However, as seen in Figure 3, despite the narrowing income inequality in this high income 
range, the cross-sectional inequality difference still persists. The inequality gap closes only 
asymptotically.  
5  Empirical Analysis  
In this section we examine the impact of public versus private health investments on 
inequality. Our key theoretical prediction is that public and private health investments affect 
longevity differentially and thus may have varied effects on inequality. We specifically test 
the hypothesis that a higher share of private to public health expenditures leads to higher 
income inequality.5   One challenge in estimating this relationship is that health investments 
may be non-randomly assigned with the government choosing to invest more in areas with 
poorer health outcomes. Further, since the effects of health investments on inequality will 
take time to materialize we need access to data over a long time period.  
                                                 
4 This result is true in general for ݍ ൏ 1. For ݍ	 ൌ 	1, it is easy to show that the dispersion in income does not 
decline overtime. We show this in an earlier version of the current paper, available on request (also see Dottori 
(2009)). 
5 This specification is consistent with our theoretical results since the private-to-public health expenditure, 
ݍ/ሺ1 െ ݍሻ is increasing in ݍ. 
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We address the potential non-random placement of vaccines is addressed using an 
instrumental variable approach. We also obtain data from multiple rounds of cross-sectional 
household surveys collected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in India 
to construct a longitudinal regional-level data that includes information about the relative 
private to public investments in vaccines and measures of inequality with the entire data 
spanning a long period of time (1986-87 to 2011-12). Next, we discuss in detail the data and 
variables used in our analysis followed by a description of the empirical methods employed.  
5.1  Data & Variables  
The NSSO quinquennially conducts consumption expenditure surveys for households across 
the nation. We use five such survey rounds (43rd, 50th, 61st, 66th and 68th rounds), spanning 
1987 to 2012.6  Like many other papers, we prefer not to use the 55th Survey Round (1999-
2000) due to differences in the recall periods (Himanshu, 2007).7 We base our inequality 
computations on the uniform recall period of 30 days across the five thick rounds. Our data 
on 2,671,022 individuals, aggregated at the regional level, spans a period of around 25 years. 
Regions are aggregates of districts with similar geographical features and population 
densities. We are able to follow around 76 regions across the five survey rounds.8   In every 
survey round, we map the individual districts with their respective original regions. For the 
newly formed districts, we identify the year and source of bifurcation and identify the 
corresponding region from the baseline survey. Together, these regions approximately cover 
the entire nation. The key variables across the quinquennial surveys are finally pooled 
together, yielding 379 observations.  
Since our data does not have direct information on the private versus public 
investment in vaccines, we create a proxy measure based on demand of vaccines from 
private versus public facilities. The key assumption here is that this relative demand is a 
good proxy for the relative investments made in public and private sources. More broadly, 
we assume that if there are more households seeking vaccination at the public facility than 
in a private facility in a region, then there are more health investments by the government 
compared with the health investments made by the private sector in the region.  
                                                 
6 NSS Round 43rd represents 1987-1988, 50th Round represents 1993-94, 61st Round represents 2004-05, 66th 
Round represents 2009-10 and 68th Round represents 2011-12. 
7 During the 55th round, expenditure on some consumption goods were reported on a 7-day recall period. This 
makes comparisons difficult. 
8 Only one region, Jhelum Valley in Jammu & Kashmir is not available for analysis 50th NSS Round. We use 
information on 76 regions for all the other survey rounds. 
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Household level data on sources for the vaccines can be obtained from the 42nd NSS 
round in 1986-87. During that survey, households were asked whether the children received 
particular vaccines from the government or from private sources (free of charge or at cost) 
or not received the vaccine at all.  
After eliminating all the invalid entries for the respective vaccines, we compute the 
ratio of the number of individuals, as a percentage of total valid responses on the vaccine, 
who obtained it from private sources within a region. Similarly, we compute the number of 
individuals, as a percentage of total valid responses on the vaccine, who obtained the same 
from public sources, within a region. Using these measures, we construct the ratio of the two 
to arrive at the relative share of private to public demand for vaccines within the region.  
We use three measures of inequality: the Gini coefficient, logarithm of the variance, 
and the variance of the logarithm (Cowell 2011). For each region-period, we calculate the 
inequality measures based on the average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (in 
INR) reported in the NSSO (Please see details in Appendix B). The expenditure data at 
current prices are converted to constant prices. This is done using aggregate deflators - CPI-
AL (at Base year 1986-87) for the rural and CPI-IW (at Base year 2001) for the urban areas 
respectively (Basole & Basu, 2015). 9 Though it is desirable to use income data for 
computing the inequality measures, nationally representative data on household income, 
spanning multiple years is hard to find in the Indian context. As in several other studies, 
consumption expenditure serves as a proxy for income in our analysis. 10   
Following Mitra & Mitra (2016), we use a set of socio-economic and demographic 
control variables at the regional levels. In order to derive population estimates, we use the 
sampling weights provided by the NSSO. In accordance with the Indian Census, the NSS 
categorizes each region into rural and urban areas. Each household in each survey is 
accordingly classified as belonging to rural or urban areas. In our analysis, we control for 
the share of rural population in each region. We use the percentage of Hindu population in 
a region as a control for religion. The percentage of individuals with secondary education 
serves as a proxy for education. In order to capture the importance of different social and 
ethnic groups in India, the households are classified into different social groups. We control 
for the percentage of individuals belonging to the scheduled caste category as a proxy for 
the social group. The Scheduled caste represents the officially designated disadvantaged 
                                                 
9  This data is obtained from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation India Time Series 
database and the Labour Bureau of the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India. 
10 See Himanshu (2007), Mitra & Mitra (2016). 
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class of people in India. We also control for the year effects in all the specifications. A data 
Appendix B provides details on the construction of additional control variables used in the 
analysis.  
5.2  Estimation Strategy  
We use the NSS rounds to construct regional-level measures of inequality and the relative 
demand for private versus public sources of vaccines. We first use ordinary least squares to 
estimate the coefficients in the following equation: 
 Inequalityୱ,୲ ൌ α ൅ β ቊ
ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁_ݒܽܿ௦,଼଺/଼଻
ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ_ݒܽܿ௦,଼଺/଼଻ ቋ ൅ ߛܼ௦,௧ ൅ Year	Dummies ൅ ߝ௦,௧ (17) 
where ݏ and ݐ represent region and year respectively, ൜௉௥௜௩௔௧௘_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ௉௨௕௟௜௖_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ ൠ is the relative 
demand for private versus public sources of vaccines and Z is a vector of socio-economic 
factors such as religion, education, social group and the share of rural population in a region. 
We estimate (17) using three alternate measures of the relative demand for private versus 
public sources of vaccines for measles, DPT and BCG vaccines. Each survey round usually 
reports the data at rural and urban areas within a state, region or district. We aggregate all 
variables from the individual to regional levels. The primary empirical challenge in this 
context lies in the possibility that the relative private versus public investments in vaccines 
is not randomly distributed across regions. In order to address this challenge, we use a two-
stage least squares (TSLS) approach. Consistent estimates of ߚ can be obtained if we have 
an instrumental variable that is strongly correlated with ൜௉௥௜௩௔௧௘_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ௉௨௕௟௜௖_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ ൠ but uncorrelated 
with ߝ௦,௧. One plausible instrumental variable is the region-specific relative demand for polio 
vaccines which we define as: 
Instrumental	Variable	ሺIVሻ  ൌ ቊܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁_ݒܽܿ௦,଼଺/଼଻ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ_ݒܽܿ௦,଼଺/଼଻ ቋ   	for	polio	vaccine	 
We argue that this is a plausible instrument for two reasons. First, the instrument is 
potentially highly correlated with  ൜௉௥௜௩௔௧௘_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ௉௨௕௟௜௖_௩௔௖ೞ,ఴల/ఴళ ൠ  for other vaccines, since it is likely that 
individuals who get for example measles vaccine from private compared to public sources, 
are more likely to obtain the polio vaccine also from private sources. Secondly, polio affects 
the muscular functions alone and compromises the quality of life but generally does not 
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affect longevity. Since longevity, in our theoretical model, is the primary channel connecting 
investments with inequality, we argue that our instrumental variable is uncorrelated with 
ߝ௦,௧. By definition, we cannot test the aforementioned assumption. However, we note that 
the bias in our OLS estimates should be towards the null since the Government is more likely 
to make investments in both high mortality and high inequality areas. Therefore, in a cross-
sectional sense regions with higher private to public share of vaccines should also be those 
where there is lower inequality.  
Although non-random government investments across regions could potentially result 
in a downward bias of our results, it is also possible that individuals in regions where income 
inequality is lower also share preferences for health systems in which public expenditure is 
more relevant, therefore producing an upward bias. In order to assess the validity of this 
concern, we use the 2002 data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) to 
create an indicator variable that equals one if the individual reports that he/she perceives that 
the quality of the public health facility is poor. The indicator variable takes on the value zero 
otherwise. We then run a regression where the independent variable is the private-public 
mix of the polio vaccine in 1987-88 and also separately the private-public mix of the polio 
vaccine in 1993-94.  
In addition, our IV (private to public ratio of vaccine provision) could be potentially 
correlated with the error term in equation (17) due to a correlation between the IV and 
disability. More specifically, the IV may be correlated with disability and hence earnings 
and earnings inequality. In order to assess the threat to the validity of our IV, we use data 
from the 2002 disability survey collected National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) to 
construct an individual-specific measure of whether or not an individual was disabled. We 
run a regression of disability on our baseline measure of the private-public mix in the 
provision of the polio vaccine to assess the strength of the correlation between the two 
variables. Details of both the NSSO data on disability and preferences and the details of the 
construction of the relevant variables is described in Appendix B.  
6  Empirical Results  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The Gini 
coefficient and the logarithm of variance are the inequality measures. The ratio of the 
demand from private to public sources of vaccines is expressed separately for measles, DPT 
and BCG. We note that there is considerable variation in the key dependent variable 
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(inequality) and the independent variables (measles, DPT and BCG). The Gini and logarithm 
of variance vary across regions. Figure 4 panels A-D represent the distribution of regions 
according to the share of private to public sources of demand for vaccination. We observe 
regional variation for all vaccines but most regions to not have any representation of the 
private sector in meeting the demand for vaccines. The dominant government role in the 
provision of vaccines is almost completely flipped in the case of health care provision in 
other areas such as pediatric care, prenatal and postnatal care. The ratio of private to public 
demand is about 0.8, more than 5 times the ratio observed for vaccines. The statistics are 
presented at various levels. In Section A, we present data from our baseline year (1986-87) 
for each of the 76 regions. In Section B we present statistics on our outcomes (inequality) as 
well as other control variables that vary over time. These statistics are therefore at the region-
year level. Finally, in Section C we present summary statistics from individual level data on 
both disability and preferences that will be used in empirical tests of the validity of our 
design.  
Table 3 presents results from an OLS regression after pooling observations of the 
years. The findings in column 1 of panel A suggests that a one standard deviation increase 
in the private-public provision of vaccines results in a 1.5 percent increase in the Gini 
coefficient. In column 2 we find that these results are robust to the inclusion of other control 
variables at the state-region level (full list of control variables is provided in the footnote to 
Table 3). In column 3, we also control for the private-public mix of hospitalisation in case 
of child ailment. We find that the effect of the private-public mix in vaccine provision 
continues to remain robust to this inclusion. Column 4 of panel A contain results when the 
logarithm of variance is used as a measure of inequality. We find that a one standard 
deviation increase in the private-public provision of vaccines results in about a 3 percent 
increase in inequality, and the results remain robust when we control other variables (column 
5) and non-vaccine health indicator (column 6).  
We choose to focus on the private to public share of vaccine provision in this paper, 
but panel B of Table 3 provides evidence that this focus is perhaps not too restrictive. In 
panel B, we present the effect of private-public mix of non-vaccine sources of care on 
inequality. We find that the effects of the non-vaccine variables is relatively small- ranging 
from about one-eight (for effects on the Gini) and one-fifth (for effects on log variance) of 
the effect observed for vaccines.  
Although the coefficients for the Gini in panel A of Table 3 are robust to the inclusion 
of other control variables, in the case where we use the logarithm of variance, the coefficients 
21 
 
decrease slightly as we move to a specification that includes control variables. This finding 
suggests that the private-public mix of vaccines is not randomly distributed across state-
regions. We therefore also present results from an instrumental variable approach that uses 
the private-public mix of the polio vaccine as an instrumental variable. The IV results in 
Table 4 suggests that a higher private to public mix in vaccine provision results in higher 
income inequality. As expected the standard errors of the point estimates of the IV 
regressions are higher than that of OLS but the point estimates are higher and so the estimates 
remain statistically significant. Further, the results are robust to the inclusion of other control 
variables. Our IV regressions have high first-stage F statistics, above the required threshold 
value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). The IV results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in private-public mix of measles increases the Gini coefficient by 2.2 percent and 
the logarithm of variance by 4.3 percent. The estimates are similar for the case of DPT. For 
BCGs, a one standard deviation increase in the private-public mix increases the Gini 
coefficient by about 3 percent and the logarithm of variance by approximately 5.8 percent. 
As noted previously due to the nature of selective investments in vaccines, our OLS 
estimates are plausibly lower-bound estimates. Our OLS (Table 3) and IV estimates (Table 
4) confirms this intuition with the IV point estimates being slightly larger than the OLS 
estimates.  
6.1  Robustness Check  
6.1.1  Stability of coefficients over time  
Our empirical strategy estimates the relationship between “baseline” measure of the relative 
intensity of private to public demand for vaccines calculated using 1986-87 data and 
subsequent inequality measures (1987-88 to 2011-12). Our regression results presented in 
tables 3 and 4 include the pooled data over all the years. In Table 5, we test the sensitivity 
of our estimates to including only specific years of data- starting from only including the 
most recent year (2011-12) in column 1 and successively adding years in columns 2, 3 and 
4. The OLS estimates for both the Gini and the logarithm of variance suggests a high degree 
of robustness for the coefficient on the private-public mix of measles coverage. The 
coefficient on the Gini is less robust when we only include the most recent data point, but 
we note that this may be due to the very high standard error on the coefficient estimate- the 
standard error in column 1 (0.035) is more than double the standard error in column 4 
(0.017). Other than this exception, the coefficients on the Gini also remain robust to using 
22 
 
different years in analysis. The IV estimates for measles, DPT and BCG using the logarithm 
of variance all suggest that our estimates are not very sensitive to the time period used in our 
analysis. Once again, we note that the point estimates all remain relatively stable, but the 
higher standard error (plausibly a result of the low sample size) when using the most recent 
year renders the coefficient statistically insignificant. Indeed, to the extent that using more 
current years data reduces the possibility of reverse causality, the findings bolster our 
confidence that our estimates in Tables 3 and 4 may be interpreted as causal effects of the 
private-public mix in the provision of vaccines on income inequality.  
6.1.2  Stability of private-public mix of vaccine coverage  
Our primary regressions use the baseline (1986-87) distribution of the private-public mix. 
However, it is possible that the baseline distribution of the relative share itself changes over 
time if Governments (or private providers) choose to make temporal changes in investments. 
To assess this possibility, we first plot the ratio of private to public vaccine demand for BCG 
vaccines in 1986-87 against the similar measure calculated in 1995-96. Figure 5 shows this 
scatter. We find that there are two striking departures where the data point lies away from 
the 45 degree line suggesting that, in these two regions, there is little stability in the private 
to public demand for BCG vaccines.  
We assess the sensitivity of our results when we drop the two outlier regions from our 
analysis. When we control for the complete list of variables (similar to column 3 of Table 
4), the point estimate on BCG is 0.083 (standard error = 0.033) in the case of the Gini and 
5.050 (standard error = 1.743) in the case of the logarithm of variance.11    
6.1.3  Bias on the estimated coefficient on relative private share in the provision of 
vaccines  
We previously noted that direction of bias in the OLS estimates should be towards the null 
since governments is more likely to invest in the poorer, high mortality areas and the private 
sector is more likely to invest in the richer, low-mortality areas. However, it is possible that 
individuals in regions where income inequality is higher also share preferences for health 
systems in which public expenditure/investment is less relevant. In particular, it is possible 
that individuals residing in high income inequality areas have lower preferences for publicly 
                                                 
11 Due to data constraints, we are unable to conduct sensitivity analysis for measles and DPT. 
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provided health care. In this case, there will be a positive correlation between the private-
public mix and income inequality, generating an upward bias in our OLS specifications. We 
assess the strength of this hypothesis by examining whether regions of higher income 
inequality also have lower preferences for government provided health care. The NSSO 
survey data in 2004-05 has a specific question on whether the individual believes that the 
government health care facilities are of poor quality. We create an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if so, and 0 otherwise. We run a regression of this variable on income inequality. The 
results are presented in Table 6 with the columns denoting estimates with and without 
adjusting for other control variables. We find that inequality levels are not correlated with 
preferences when we use the baseline inequality measure, regardless of the inequality 
measure. When we use inequality measures as of 1993-94, we find insignificant coefficient 
on the Gini, but find that higher variance in the logarithm of income (higher income 
inequality) is associated with a greater preference for government public facilities. Overall, 
our results suggest that we could continue to treat the OLS estimates as providing lower 
bounds.  
6.1.4  Threats to validity of the instrumental variable  
The instrumental variable we use is the private-public mix of the polio vaccine. Although 
we show (using our first stage F-statistic) that the IV is strongly correlated with the main 
independent variable, it is possible that the IV is correlated with disability and hence 
earnings and earnings inequality. The polio vaccine’s primary purpose is to prevent a 
disability and disability is a known correlate of lower earnings. We therefore examine 
whether our IV is correlated with disability. In 2002, the NSSO conducted a large national 
survey to understand the prevalence and characteristics of disability in India. We use this 
data and merge it with our instrumental variable-our baseline measure of private-public mix 
of provision of the polio vaccine. The results are presented in Table 7 and suggest that there 
is no correlation between the share of the private sector in the vaccine provision and 
disability, a result that bolsters confidence in the validity of our IV.  
7  Conclusion  
In this paper we seek to establish both theoretically and empirically the link between the 
relative shares of public and private health expenditures and cross sectional income 
inequality. In a model where mortality is endogenous and is function of both public and 
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private health expenditures, we show that cross sectional income inequality is non- 
decreasing in the share of private health expenditure.  
We empirically test our theoretical prediction using region-level data from India. 
Specifically, we examine the manner in which a higher share of the private sector in the 
provision of vaccines affects income inequality. We use vaccination data on the relative 
private-public share of vaccine provision in 76 regions in India in the year 1986-87. We also 
use multiple household-level consumption expenditure survey rounds to construct inequality 
measures within each region in India for the period spanning 1987-88 through 2011-12. OLS 
regressions are potentially biased due to non-random investments in vaccines across regions. 
Using the relative private-public share of the polio vaccine as an instrumental variable 
approach, we examine the strength of the link between the relative private shares and income 
inequality in an instrumental variable analysis. Our identification strategy rests on the 
assumption that Government (or private) investments in the polio vaccine does not affect 
mortality and hence inequality.  
Estimates from both our OLS and IV models suggest that increasing the relative share 
of private sources of health care provision is associated with an increase in expenditure 
inequality. More specifically our OLS estimates for measles imply that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in the relative private share in vaccine provision results in a 1.5 percent 
increase in the Gini coefficient and a 3 percent increase in the variance of the logarithm of 
income. Our findings based on the IV analysis suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase 
in the relative private share results in a 2.2 % increase in the Gini and a 4.3 % increase in 
the variance of the logarithm of earnings. As noted previously due to the nature of selective 
investments in vaccines, our OLS estimates are plausibly lower-bound estimates and the 
higher magnitude of the IV estimates confirms this intuition.  
Although we focus on vaccines, we observe that the effects are also robust to the 
inclusion of the private share in non-vaccine health care investments. Furthermore to the 
extent that inequality is relatively permanent, we find that our results are also robust to the 
inclusion of initial income inequality. Our primary results pool observations over the years 
but in a robustness analysis we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to using cross-
sectional “snapshots” of our data and again find that the initial relative private share in 
vaccines is related to subsequent income inequality.  
Given the observational nature of the analysis, the findings are subject to a few 
limitations. First, it is not possible to confirm the validity of our instrumental variable due 
to data limitations. In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that unmeasured factors 
25 
 
affect both income inequality and the instrumental variable. Nevertheless, we do posit that 
the direction of the bias in our OLS estimates is most likely towards the null hypothesis 
suggesting that our OLS estimates may be considered lower bound estimates. Second, 
although we have used the demand for vaccines as a proxy for investments in health. It is 
possible that at the regional-level, demand for vaccines is only an imperfect indicator for 
actual investments. For example, although a particular region has heavy Government 
investments in vaccines, the demand for Government sources may be low if households 
perceive poor quality of the provider. Even so, to the extent that the relative private share in 
demand measures the relative private share in health investment with random error, our OLS 
estimates should once again be biased downward towards zero and hence provide a lower-
bound estimate of the true effect.  
India has recently announced a new National Health Policy that seeks to rapidly increase 
government investments in the health sector- a move that could increase the percent of 
government health expenditure in overall GDP from 1.3 percent to 2.5 percent. Moreover, a 
program titled Mission Indradhanush has been recently launched by the government and 
seeks to ramp up the childhood vaccination rates to over 90 percent by the year 2020. If 
these materialize in reductions in poor health outcomes, our findings suggest that the 
increasing health investments envisaged by the Government of India could play a role in not 
only improving health but in also lowering subsequent levels of income inequality.  
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A.  Appendix  
In this section, we provide proofs of the propositions.  
A.1  Proof of Proposition 1 
For proof of this proposition, first observe that (15) implies that ܪᇱ ൐ 0 for any ݁௧, ܪᇱᇱ ൐ 0  
for ݁௧ ൏   ݁̅ and ܪᇱᇱ ൌ 0 for ݁௧ ൒ ݁̅. Thus, the law of motion is convex for ݁௧ ൏ ݁̅ and then 
linear thereafter. Also, it is continuous for all ݁௧. To see this, ܪ is piece-wise continuous for ݁ ൏ ݁̅ and ݁ ൒ ݁̅ and, lim௘→௘̅ష ܪሺ݁ሻ ൌ lim	௘→௘̅శ ܪሺ݁ሻ. 
*Existence: Graphically, the fixed points exist where the graph crosses the 45 degree 
line. Since ܪሺ0ሻ  ൌ  0, the existence of the poverty trap fixed point ݁ఝ is guaranteed. 
Moreover, there may exist at most one more fixed point, ݁௨ ൐ 0 if and only if the long-run 
growth rate along the sustained growth path satisfies ݃ ൌ ߦ ఏటഄశഌ௘̅ഄଵାఏటഄ௘̅ഄ > 1. To see this, suppose 
݃ ൐ 1, then ܪሺ݁௧ሻ ൌ ݁௧ାଵ ൒ ݁௧, for any ݁௧ ൒ ݁̅. By ܪሺ0ሻ ൌ 0 and the continuity of ܪ, its 
graph crosses the 45 degree line for some ݁௧ ൏ ݁̅. Conversely, suppose that the graph is 
above the 45 degree line at ݁̅ but ݃ ൏ 1,then ܪሺ݁௧ሻ ൏ ݁̅ too. This is contradictory. Suppose 
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even if ݁௨ exists, it is not along the convex part of the graph. So the fixed point is made at 
the linear part, where ݁௧ ൐ ݁̅. This means that lim௘→௘̅ష ܪ′ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߝߢሻ݃ ൏ 1, but 
lim௘→௘̅శ ܪ′ሺ݁ሻ ൌg > 1, where ߢ ൌ
ଵ
ሺଵାఏటഄ௘̅ഄሻ. Since ߢ  ∈   ሺ0,  1ሻ, this is contradiction.12 This 
implies that ݁௨ exists along the convex part as in Figure 2. Therefore, H crosses the 45 
degree line just once for ݁ ൐ 0. Clearly, ݁ఝis stable and ݁௨ is unstable.  
A.2  Proof of Proposition 2 
From eq (15), డுሺ௘೟ሻడఏ ൐ 0. Since 
డఏ
డ௤ ൐ 0 (recall ߠ ≡ ܣሺ1  ൅  ߙݍሻ), the first result follows 
immediately. Recall ݁௨ is the positive fixed point at which ܪሺ݁௨ሻ ൌ ݁௨. Since an increase 
in ݍ shifts up ܪሺ݁ሻ, it moves the fixed point to the left. From Proposition (1B) the long-run 
growth rate is ݃ ൌ ߦ ఏటഄశഌ௘̅ഄଵାఏటഄ௘̅ഄ. The result obtains because 
డ௚
డ௤ ൌ
డ௚
డఏ
డఏ
డ௤ ൐ 0  
B.  Data Appendix on construction of additional variables used in analysis  
B.1  Inequality  
Gini coefficient, Logarithmic Variance and Variance of logarithms of consumer expenditure 
data were computed at individual level using price-deflated measures of expenditure. We 
referred to 42nd, 43rd and 50th NSS Survey Rounds to compute inequality for every state-
region. 
ܮ݋݃ܽݎ݅ݐ݄݉݅ܿ	ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	 ൌ 	 1݊෍ሾ݈݋݃ ൬
ݕ௜
ݕത ൰ሿ
ଶ
௜
	
ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	݈݋݃ܽݎ݅ݐ݄݉ݏ	 ൌ 	 1݊෍ሾ݈݋݃ ൬
ݕ௜
ݕ∗൰ሿ
ଶ
௜
	
where ݕത is the mean of ݕ௜ (income) and y∗ is the geometric mean of ݕ௜. We note that while 
the logarithmic variance is a commonly used measure of inequality, the variance of 
logarithms has also been used as an alternative (Cowell 2011). Since income data is 
unavailable in the NSSO, we use per capita monthly consumption expenditure data to 
compute our inequality measures.  
 
                                                 
12 The discussion indicates that there may exists infinite fixed points in a special case when ݃	 ൌ 	1. This case 
is rather non-generic and not interesting in terms of economic dynamics we aim to analyze. Also, this has a 
counter-factual economic implication that the sustained growth occurs only when the observed longevity 
reaches the biological limit. Thus, we do not consider it. 
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B.2  Per capita number of community health centers (CHC)  
This serves as a proxy for the supply of public health care. It measures the number of 
Community Health Centres reported during the Five year plan (1981-85), at the state level. 
We use the state level population data from 1981 census to compute the per capita number 
of CHCs in a state. This data is from Rural Health Statistics Report (2014-15)13, and the 
population data is from the Planning Commission Report. For the newly formed states, such 
as, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telengana or Uttarakhand, we use the same population numbers 
as the corresponding original state (from which these new states were formed).  
B.3  Non-Vaccine indicators  
We used other proxy variables to understand the relative private to public mix in health care 
delivery. For this we used the questions asked during 42nd NSS Round, whereby the 
respondents had to indicate whether they received the care form private or public sources. 
The questions asked were: (a) Whether the child was hospitalised on account of any 
ailment/injury during the last 365 days, (b) Whether the mother was registered for prenatal 
care in hospital or with doctor, (c) Whether the mother was registered for post-natal care in 
hospital or PHC.  
The common options stated for these questions were: NA; Public Hospital; Primary 
Health Centre; Public Dispensary; Private Hospital; Nursing Home; Charitable institution 
run by trust; government doctor; private doctor; Others. Any individual who received health 
care from a public hospital or a primary health centre or a public dispensary or a government 
doctor was categorized as having received health care form public sources. Everyone else 
was categorized to have received it from private sources. This individual data was then 
aggregated to regional level.  
B.4  Disability due to Polio  
This was derived at the individual level form the 58th Round (2002), Schedule 26 of the 
Survey of Disabled Persons. The specific question was whether the individual reported any 
disability; if so whether this was form birth and if not, then what is the cause of the disability. 
Individuals who reported disability due to Polio were assigned a unit value and the others 
assumed a value zero for this binary indicator variable.  
                                                 
13 Source: http://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/RHS_1.pdf 
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Preference against Public health due to quality issue: This was computed at the 
individual level from the 60th NSS Round (2004), Schedule 25. This question was asked to 
individuals who reported any ailment during the last 15 days. The specific question was 
whether any treatment was taken on medical advice; if yes, then whether any treatment 
received from government sources. If the treatment was not sought from the government 
sources, individuals were asked to list reasons for overlooking public facilities. The choices 
were: (a) government doctor/facility too far; (b) not satisfied with medical treatment by 
government doctor/facility; (c) Long waiting period before one can get appointment; (d) 
required specific services not available; and (e) others. We generated a binary indicator 
variable equal to 1 when individuals reported that they did not seek the government advice 
as they were not satisfied with the quality. The others were assigned a zero value. The 
variable proxies for strong preferences against using the public health facilities.  
B.5  Imputed total Health Expenditure (% Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP))  
Total health expenditure has public and private components. We obtain state level data on 
Public health expenditure (as % Gross State Domestic Product) from the Health Care 
Expenditure statistics from the Government of India for the period 1974-75 to 1990-99, 
published by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.14  We use the public share 
data as of 1986-87 (at current Prices). As private health expenditure data is unavailable, we 
use an approximate ratio of Public to Private Hospitals, from Special Statistics on Health 
Expenditure across States by Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT). 
As the ratio is stated as 45.3 to 54.7, we use it to compute the private health expenditure (as 
% Gross state Domestic Product). Finally, we add up the two components to derive the share 
of total health expenditure (%GSDP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See: 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2014/10/HEALTH_CARE_EXPENDITURE_BY_GOVERNM
ENT_IN_INDIA_1947-75_TO_1990-91.pdf. 
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 Figure 1: Long-run effect of health care system on income inequality 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Database; The Standardised World Income Inequality database (SWIID 
database) 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the public health expenditure as percentage of total health expenditure 
as of 1995, which proxies the extent to which a country is leaning toward the public healthcare regime. The 
vertical axis is the Gini coefficient in 2010 based on disposable income.  
ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 nomenclature is used for the country codes. 
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Figure 2: Earnings dynamics under homogeneous households 
Fixed point equilibria 
 
B. Earnings dynamics under different mix of private and public health expenditure  
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Gini coefficients under different private-public mix of health 
expenditure 
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Figure 4: Relative distribution of private and public providers of Measles, BCG, DPT 
and Polio vaccines during 1986-87 
‘   
Panel (A)      Panel (B) 
  
Panel (C)      Panel (D) 
Source: Aggregated at the regional level using data from the 42nd NSS Round. 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the measure of relative share of private to public sources for different 
vaccines of our study. The relative share of the vaccine providers is given by the ratio of the proportion of 
individuals, out of the total valid entries, who received the vaccine from private to the proportion of individuals, 
out of the total valid entries, who received it from public sources in a region. Relative share of private and 
public sources vary across vaccines. While Measles vaccine in several regions is provided by both public and 
priavte providers, there is a clear dominance of public providers in the case of DPT vaccine.   
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Figure 5: Relative share of Private to public providers of BCG vaccine in 42nd and 
52nd NSS Rounds 
                                 
                                          
 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis depicts the relative share of private to public providers of BCG vaccines in 42nd 
NSS Round (1986-87). The vertical axis represents the same during the 52nd NSS Round (1995-96). Clustering 
of the points near the 45 degree line denotes that the regional pattern of the share of private to public 
provisioning did not change across the two survey rounds. From this, we can identify only two regions where 
the patterns differed over time. We treat them as potential outliers. These two regions are “Central Bihar” 
and “Himalayan West Bengal”. 
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Table 1:  Baseline calibration 
 
 
Parameter Description Calibrated 
value 
Matching 
ݍ Share of private expenditure in total 
health expenditure 
0.7 Indian sample, 1995-
2014  
ܣ Effectiveness (scale) parameter of 
health expenditure 
0.2866 Life expectancy, India 
1985-2015 
߳ Elasticity of longevity increase with 
respect to health input 
0.21 Life expectancy, India 
1985-2015 
ߙ Share of total (public + private) 
expenditure to consumption 
0.05 Indian sample, 1995-
2014 
ߥ Effect of childhood health investment 
on human capital production 
0.1 Dottori (2009). Also, 
Bloom, Canning, and 
Sevilla (2004) 
and WHO, World 
Health Organization 
(2001) 
ߦ Scale parameter for human capital 
production 
4.1548 Long-run annual 
growth of 2% 
 
Sources: Indian data are obtained through World Bank Open Data.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in analysis 
 
     
Mean 
 
Standard deviation 
Measles        0.131 0.192 
DPT        0.143 0.359 
BCG        0.147 0.351 
Polio     0.093 0.136 
Where was child hospitalised for ailment        0.848                     1.455 
Where mother registered for prenatal care        0.812 1.204 
Where mother registered for postnatal care        0.839 1.225 
Per capita total CHCs 
Imputed total Health Expenditure (%GSDP) 
       0.017 
            4.021 
0.029 
                                         3.511 
Initial Inequality (Gini from 42nd NSS 
Survey) 0.814                                          0.022 
Sample Size   (N= 76)   
Section B   
Gini coefficient        0.533 0.071 
Logarithm of variance        1.378 0.379 
Variance of Logarithm        1.020 0.259 
% population with secondary education        8.345                  3.913 
% Hindu population        77.953 23.769 
% rural population        73.528 16.621 
% scheduled caste (SC)        16.559                   8.917 
Sample Size   (N= 379)   
Section C   
Disability due to Polio 
Sample Size (N= 78,827) 
        0.099 
 
0.299 
 
Preference against public health facilities due 
to poor perceived quality 
Sample Size (N= 29,516) 
        0.348                   0.476 
 
 
 
Notes: Section A - Each vaccine (measles, DPT, BCG and Polio) represents the relative share of private to public 
sources of vaccines in each region from the 42nd NSS round (1986-87). There are 76 observations corresponding to 
76 regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Table 3: Pooled OLS estimates of the effect of relative private to public investments on 
income inequality [Robust standard error] 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Outcome variable is the Gini coefficient and the logarithm variance of per capita consumption expenditure at regional 
levels. Regressions are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (1a) and (2a) are without any control variables. In columns 
(1b) and (2b) we control for the following control variables [m] rural population, education, social group, religion at the regional 
level, initial inequality from the 42nd round, per-capita number of community health centers (CHCs), and share of total health 
expenditure in the Gross State Domestic Product (GDSP), imputed with the average across states for the missing observations and 
year effects. Columns (1c) and (2c) control for a non-vaccine private-public health mix, in addition to the control variables used 
in Columns (1b) and (2b). The number of CHCs, the expenditure data and non-vaccine measures approximately correspond to our 
base year of analysis, 1986-87. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at region level.  
*** significant at 1-percent level, ** significant at 5-percent level, * significant at 10-percent level. 
   
  Gini Coefficient   Logarithm of Variance 
 Unadjuste
d for 
control 
variables 
Adjusted 
for control 
variables 
[m] 
Adjusted for control 
variables &a non-
vaccine private-
public mix) 
 Unadjust
ed for 
control 
variables 
Adjusted 
for 
control 
variables 
[m] 
Adjusted for control 
variables & a non-
vaccine private-
public mix 
 (1a) (1b)             (1c)  (2a) (2b) (2c) 
Panel A.         
 Measles     0.041**   0.041**  0.035*    0.187*   0.175**   0.174** 
  [0.021] [0.017]  [0.018]   [0.098] [0.079] [0.084] 
Place of child 
hospitalisation 
    
 
              0.004              
           [0.003] 
                 0.003 
[0.010] 
Year effect Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.047 0.140 0.170  0.237 0.364 0.399 
Sample Size 369 366 351  369 366 351 
Panel B. Only using non-vaccine private to public mix:     
Place of child 
hospitalisation 
0.005** 
  [0.002] 
0.005* 
[0.003]              - 
  0.016 
[0.01] 
 0.009  
[0.009] - 
Place of 
prenatal care 
  0.007*** 
  [0.003] 
  0.006**     
[0.002]             - 
 0.035*** 
[0.012] 
0.030*** 
[0.011] - 
Place of 
postnatal care 
 0.006** 
[0.003] 
0.005* 
[0.003]             - 
 0.033** 
[0.013] 
0.014  
[0.014] - 
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Table 4: Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of relative private to public investments in vaccines on income inequality 
[robust standard error] 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Outcome variable is the Gini coefficient and the logarithm variance of per capita consumption expenditure at regional level. Columns (1a), (2a) and (3a) are without control 
variables. Control variables in columns (1b) and (2b) include the Share of rural population, Percentage of population with secondary education, social group and religion at the regional 
level. Columns (1c), (2c) and (3c) adjust for regional inequality measures from the 42nd Round, state level per capita CHCs and total health expenditure (% GSDP) at state level, in 
addition to the control variables used in Columns (1b) and (2b). Both the number of CHCs and the expenditure data approximately correspond to the base line year, 1986-87. The 
excluded instrumental variable in each case is the private to public ratio of the source of polio vaccine at regional level. First Stage F-statistic for Measles is 32.35; for DPT is 25.42; 
for BCG is 10.73. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at region level.  
*** significant at 1-percent level, ** significant at 5-percent level, * significant at 10-percent level. 
                                         
     Gini Coefficient   Logarithm of Variance                      Variance of logarithms 
 Unadjusted 
for control 
variables 
Adjusted for 
control 
variables 
Adjusted for control 
variables, initial 
inequality,  per capita  
CHCs  and total 
health 
expenditure(%GSDP) 
 Unadjust
ed for 
control 
variables 
Adjusted 
for 
control 
variables 
Adjusted for control 
variables, initial 
inequality,  per capita 
CHCs and total health 
expenditure(%GSDP) 
Unadjusted for 
control variables 
Adjusted for control 
variables, initial 
inequality,  per capita 
CHCs and total 
health 
expenditure(%GSDP) 
 (1a) (1b)                (1c)  (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3c) 
A. Measles  0.057**  0.055**   0.061**  0.324***  0.281**  0.243**    0.258***  0.202** 
 [0.024] [0.022]             [0.025]  [0.122] [0.111] [0.119] [0.094] [0.088] 
          
B. DPT 0.052**  0.050**   0.053**  0.279**  0.250** 0.241*  0.224**  0.177** 
     [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]  [0.114] [0.113 ] [0.130] [0.089] [0.085] 
          
C. BCG 0.086**  0.083**   0.089**  0.504***  0.439**   0.377**    0.400***  0.314** 
     [0.034] [0.033] [0.036]  [0.177] [0.172] [0.184] [0.135] [0.135] 
          
          
Year effect Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 5:  Stability in regression coefficients over time [standard error] 
 
  
 2011-12   2009-10,  
2011-12 
2004-05, 
2009-10, 
2011-12 
1993-94,  
2004-05, 
2009-10, 
2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pooled OLS     
  
Log Variance 
    
   Measles 0.121 0.175** 0.152** 0.148** 
 [0.127] [0.077] [0.069] [0.070] 
   Sample Size 74 148 221 293 
 
Variance of Logarithms 
   
   Measles 0.088 0.121** 0.111** 0.111** 
 [0.079] [0.052] [0.047] [0.048] 
   Sample Size 74 148 221 293 
  
 Gini     
   Measles -0.004 0.031 0.035* 0.035** 
 [0.035] [0.021] [0.019] [0.017] 
  
  Sample Size 
 
74 
 
148 
 
221 
 
293 
Instrumental variable analysis    
    
Logarithmic Variance    
 
Measles 
 
0.203 
 
0.292** 
 
0.260** 
 
0.245** 
 [0.188] [0.130] [0.117] [0.111] 
 
DPT 
 
0.190 
[0.177] 
 
0.255** 
[0.119] 
 
0.225** 
[0.110] 
 
0.221* 
[0.112] 
     
BCG 0.301 0.415** 0.368* 0.345* 
 [0.276] [0.206] [0.188] [0.187] 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is region-year. Outcome variable is the Gini coefficient and the logarithm variance of per capita 
consumption expenditure at regional level. The five survey rounds considered for analysis are- 43rd round (1987-1988) 50th round, 
(1993-1994); 61st round, (2004-2005); 66th round, (2009-2010) and 68th round, (2011-2012). Column (1) uses the latest Consumer 
Expenditure NSS Survey (68th) and the relative private to public vaccine sources from the 42nd NSS Round; Column (2) uses the 
latest two Consumer Expenditure NSS Surveys (68th & 66th); Column (3) uses the latest three Consumer Expenditure NSS Surveys 
(68th, 66th and 61st); Column (4) uses the latest four Consumer Expenditure NSS Surveys (68th, 66th, 61st and 50th). The control 
variables used in all the columns include the Share of rural population, Percentage of population with secondary education, social 
group, religion and year effects. The excluded instrumental variable is the private to public ratio of the source of polio vaccine at 
regional level. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at region level.  
*** significant at 1-percent level, ** significant at 5-percent level, * significant at 10-percent level. 
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Table 6: Relationship between preferences for public health facilities and income 
inequality [robust standard error] 
 
Preference against using public health facility as the service quality is not 
satisfactory (2004) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted for 
control variables 
 (1) (2) 
Inequality in 1987-88 (43rd Round)   
Gini  -0.195 -0.134 
 [0.332] [0.334] 
Logarithm of variance -0.008 -0.014 
 [0.056] [0.057] 
Sample size 29,513 29,341 
   
Inequality in 1993-94 (50th Round)   
Gini  -0.221 -0.143 
 [0.406] [0.398] 
Logarithm of variance           0.005         0.002 
 [0.074] [0.075] 
 Sample size 29,323         29,151 
 
                        
Notes: This table reports Pooled OLS results. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if individuals preferred not to use 
the government sources for treatment because they were not satisfied with the quality. All other individuals who opted for public 
or private sources of treatment for other reasons assumed an indicator value, zero. Data on preference comes from the 60th NSSO 
Survey on Morbidity & Health care (2004). The inequality measure is at regional level from the 43rd NSS Survey (1987-88). We 
also separately use inequality measures from the 50th NSS Survey (1993-94). Control variables include age, sector and social 
group of the individuals. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at region level.  
*** significant at 1-percent level, ** significant at 5-percent level, * significant at 10-percent level. 
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Table 7:  Relationship between ratio of private-public investments in polio vaccine on 
subsequent disability due to Polio [robust standard error] 
 
Cause of disability due to Polio (2002) 
 Polio as the cause 
of disability 
(unadjusted) 
Polio as the 
cause of 
disability 
(adjusted) 
 (1) (2) 
Private-public polio vaccine in 1986-87 -0.023 -0.022 
 [0.025] [0.024] 
   
Sample size 
 78,827 78,709 
                        
                       
Notes: This table reports Pooled OLS results. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if an individual reports disability 
due to Polio. All other individuals, reporting disability due to other reasons assume a value zero. Data on disability comes from 
the 58th NSSO Survey of Disabled Persons (2002). Private-public sources of the polio vaccine is at region level, from the 42nd NSS 
Round. Column (1) is without any control variable. Column (2) controls for sector, Class according to expenditure level, social 
group, general education of the principal earner in the household. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the region level.  
*** significant at 1-percent level, ** significant at 5-percent level, * significant at 10-percent level. 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
